



Assessing IDH's contribution to public good impacts at scale (2016-20)

End-line portfolio evaluation on the
existing evidence behind IDH's impact
stories

Executive Summary

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Preface

The objective of IDH - The Sustainable Trade Initiative is to improve the economic, social and environmental sustainability of production systems in developing countries through sector systemic change

This Executive Summary and the accompanying End Evaluation Report* provide an understanding of the extent to which changes in business practices, improved sector governance and field-level sustainability with respect to the five impact themes have occurred, and whether IDH's contribution could be measured. Lessons learned from the evaluation should support IDH to improve its future performance

A panel of three methodological experts has provided feedback to the methodological approach of this end-line evaluation and challenged our conclusions as presented in the final draft version of this report. Their constructive feedback was used to validate and shape the methodology and strengthen this final report. The following methodological experts were on the panel: Prof. Dr. Karen Maas (Impact Centre Erasmus), Dr. Bart de Steenhuisen Piters (Wageningen Economic Research) and Dr. Alexander Otgaar (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

A team of independent experts (one per impact theme) validated the feasibility of IDH's updated impact pathways and contextualized this with recent literature. They reflected on draft conclusions of our assessment. Their feedback was incorporated in the final version of the report. The following experts were on the panel: Dr. Alejandro Guarin (International Institute for Environment and Development), Dr. Eric Arets (Wageningen University & Research), Dr. Anna Laven (Rokit Science/KIT Royal Tropical Institute), Emeritus professor Graham Matthews (Imperial College London) and Dr. Matthew Alford (University of Manchester).

The report and this executive summary have been prepared by a team from KPMG Advisory N.V. coordinated by Brigitte Campfens, and under the overall guidance of Jerwin Tholen.

We would like to thank those who contributed to this report.

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*) Report: "Assessing IDH's contribution to public good impacts at scale (2016–20) - End-line portfolio evaluation on the existing evidence behind IDH's impact stories"




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IDH 2016-20 in a nutshell

IDH has been working to improve the sustainability of production systems in developing countries through supply chains since 2008.

IDH aims to change the business practices of financial institutions, retailers, brands, manufacturers, traders, and producers in terms of sustainable sourcing, investments, monitoring, and offering services to farmers and workers. To secure effective and structural change, public and private strengths need to be aligned through sector and landscape governance. Part of IDH's exit strategy is to institutionalize sector governance and embed it within business strategy and practices.

IDH's deployment strategy can be summarized as follows (Figure I) :

- **Convening:** IDH bundles public and private interests and strengths to solve complex issues and unlock large-scale sustainable production and trade; IDH convenes governments, civil society organizations, and companies in public-private action-oriented coalitions across global commodity supply chains.
- **Co-investing:** through co-funding, IDH leverages business interests to drive sustainable sector transformation; IDH co-creates and prototypes private-sector-driven solutions that are to be internalized by businesses, in an enabling environment of effective public-private collaboration.
- **Learning & Innovation:** IDH pilots, evaluates, and disseminates lessons learnt and best practices.

Over the course of the evaluation period (2016-20) IDH continued to innovate. It aimed to create new ways to reach impact at scale by leveraging its ability to quickly adjust initiatives as well to provide the next intervention responding to the phase of market transformation of a specific sector.

Currently IDH has programs and projects running in 36 countries (excl Europe) covering over 25 commodities. IDH headquarters is in the Netherlands. Although we observed an increase in local entities, the underlying vision is that IDH establishes legal presence only in countries where a long-term strategy to develop and manage locally funded programs is in place, or where this is required based on local laws. IDH works with 600+ public and private partners, and its achievements are a result of these collaborations.¹

Figure I: IDH's deployment strategy and interaction with stakeholders ²



¹ Source: IDH Annual Report 2020

² Source image: IDH MYP 2016-2020 vol I

Key terminology

Result Areas

IDH aims to create change in three result areas in order to drive market transformation and achieve systemic impact for the public good:

- **Sector Governance:** Sector agencies and institutions manage the sector in a more sustainable way, at local and international levels.
- **Business Practices:** The main corporate actors in the value chain adopt more sustainable business practices.
- **Field Level Sustainability:** Positive impact on producers, workers, and producer communities, including their economic situation, their social well-being, and the sustainability of their natural resource base.

Impact Themes

For its strategy 2016-20 IDH defined five cross-cutting impact themes that help to reach the SDGs and focus efforts. These **impact themes** are:

- Smallholder Inclusion
- Mitigation of Deforestation
- Gender Equality and Empowerment
- Responsible Agrochemical Management
- Living Wage and Working Conditions

Proof of Concept






















Since 2018, IDH programs have organized activities under several Proofs of Concept (PoCs) and IDH used these PoCs to report progress in all annual reporting. IDH has defined a PoC as follows: ‘proven, scalable, private sector-driven solutions which are internalized by the businesses that IDH works with, in an enabling environment of effective public-private collaboration and within viable economic mechanisms.’ Within each PoC the different deployment strategies are addressed tailored to the specific objective of the respective PoC.

Figure II details the PoCs in scope of this assessment.






Theory of Change

For each impact theme, a Theory of Change (ToC)³ was formulated in 2016 and these ToCs were updated over the course of the evaluation period. These (updated) ToCs were used as the starting point for the evidence assessment on IDH’s actual contribution in both the midterm as well as in this end-line evaluation.

Figure II: Programs/Landscapes and Proofs of Concept in scope of the end line evaluation including the impact themes they address

Program/landscape	Proof of Concept
Apparel  	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Working conditions - Race to the Top — Working conditions: Life And Building Safety (LABS)
Cocoa   	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Farm and Coop Investment Program (FCIP) — Cocoa Nutrition initiative — Cocoa & Forests initiative (CFI)
Coffee  	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Smallholder resilience — Water and climate smart agriculture — Responsible use of agro-inputs
Cotton   	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) — Climate Resilience Program
Fresh & Ingredients    	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Commodity platforms and sustainable sourcing — Value chain development (VCD)
Aquaculture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Aquascapes – do more with less — Local food - Production and value chain development — Innovation – data driven approach
Market End Programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Market-end program Palm Oil — Market-end program Soy — Market-end program Tropical Timber — SourceUp
Tea    	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Malawi Tea 2020 — Gender Kenya — India Trustea — Smallholder projects
Landscapes (NICFI & ISLA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Brazil — Indonesia — Liberia — Côte D'Ivoire — Ethiopia — Kenya — Vietnam

IDH's impact themes:

-  Smallholder Inclusion
-  Mitigation of Deforestation
-  Gender Equality and Empowerment
-  Responsible Agrochemical Management
-  Living Wage and Working Conditions

³ Theories of Change (ToCs) are also referred to as Impact Pathways by IDH. For the purposes of this end-line evaluation we use the term Theory of Change (ToC) throughout.

Introduction to the evaluation & research approach (I/II)

Objective of this end-line evaluation

The overall objective of this end-line evaluation is to assess IDH's 2016-20 program portfolio against the evaluation criteria of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC)⁴: Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability. Lessons learned from the evaluation should support IDH to improve its future performance.

Research questions

In this report we answer the following research questions:

- I. How did IDH perform against the OECD/DAC criteria: Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability?
 - II. To what extent did IDH's recent portfolio innovations enhance performance?
 - III. How did IDH's programs and landscapes perform with respect to three result levels (outputs, outcomes, and impacts) and three result areas (sector governance, business practices and field level sustainability)?
4. Conclusions and insights are validated leveraging stakeholder interviews, a sector survey and evidence from the different program evaluations per impact theme.
- II. To what extent did recent innovations of IDH's portfolio enhance IDH's performance in this context?
 1. We identified IDH's innovation strategies and the respective core innovation through interviews and validation sessions with IDH's management team and a review of the annual plans.
 2. To measure the effectiveness of IDH's innovations, we analyzed whether a measured increase in programs, change in impact themes, outreach (geographically and population), or private sector engagement (number of partners, budget invested) could be linked to the core innovations of the respective strategies.
 3. We validated and contextualized our findings through key expert interviews and the sector survey to measure to what extent the innovations increased the additionality of IDH and relevance for the sector and communities.

Methodology and research approach

We applied a stepwise approach applied for each research question but leveraged the same data sources. Out overall approach is summarized in Figure III.

Figure III: Summary of our research approach



- I. How did IDH perform against the OECD/DAC criteria: Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability?
 1. We assessed how the OECD/DAC criteria are embedded in IDH organization through policies and procedures.
 2. We evaluated how projects apply these processes and/or how they act in practice; for this we selected six projects, the so called "in-depth assessments". (see appendix I) These projects should be able to illustrate IDH's performance but are not expected to represent the full portfolio. In addition to the available documents per project, we used interviews with the project teams.
 3. We included a meta-evaluation of seven recently conducted ex-post evaluations of IDH programs. (See appendix II)

⁴ Criteria of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC)

Introduction to the evaluation & research approach (II/II)

III. How did IDH's programs and landscapes perform with respect to three result levels (outputs, outcomes, and impacts) and three result areas (sector governance, business practices and field level sustainability)?

The core of the methodology applied in the first assessment, the midterm evaluation and this end-line evaluation, is based on contribution analysis, combined with elements of process tracing to develop and underpin the Theory of Change (ToC) for each impact theme. Rather than attribution of net effects, contribution analyses focus on whether a convincing claim can be made that IDH has been a necessary factor, in a configuration of actors and factors, which created the observed changes. IDH operates in an external context and partners with many other parties. Observing IDH's contribution does not mean others did not contribute. Where applicable we acknowledge these other parties but do not quantify their contributions.


1. A panel of theme experts confirmed plausibility of the Theories of Change (ToCs). The ToCs reflect IDH's expectations about the causal relations between its support activities and their final outcomes and impact per impact theme. We adjusted the assessment framework used in the midterm in answer to IDH's request to report at PoC level instead of Program level.
2. We assessed the available evidence to verify and refine the rationale behind each of the ToCs. We consulted the IDH team for clarification or requested additional documentation. We validated our findings with the IDH program teams.
3. We triangulated our initial findings through stakeholder interviews and the survey results. We asked interviewees about specific moments in time when changes have taken place in a sector, and examples of how IDH activities and events have played a role in these change processes. We used a survey to capture perceptions on IDH's impact from a broad group of stakeholders.
4. We validated our final findings with the IDH program teams and the IDH Management Team.
5. A final validation was done through consultation with the theme expert panel. Their validation statements, in which they endorse our conclusions, are included in our report.

A panel of three methodological experts has provided feedback on the methodological approach of this end-line Evaluation and challenged our conclusions as presented in the final draft version of this report. Their feedback was used to validate and shape the methodology and strengthen this final report. The framework expert consultation as well as the summary of the final consultation session can be found in Appendix VI.

Sources used for the analysis

We assessed different sources of evidence (Figure IV) to answer the research questions. Some of the sources cover the entire scope of IDH's intervention at that time, others tune in to a specific topic.

Figure IV Sources of information used in the evaluation



Limitations due to quality of evidence provided

We systematically assessed the quality of evidence provided by IDH's data room. We based our conclusions on the strongest evidence available, which ideally would be a third-party end evaluation. Not all PoCs could provide such a report. Generally, for the most material PoCs (those with the highest budget invested at program level) IDH did invest in such an evaluation. For the other PoCs we had to base our conclusions on mostly internal project documents and made sure we triangulated through stakeholder interviews and expert validation.

2. IDH's performance against the OECD DAC criteria



IDH ensures relevance and additionality prior to its interventions. Available ex-post evaluations and stakeholder consultation confirm relevance and additionality

IDH's Investment Committee Process safeguards adherence to the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCEd)⁵ criteria. Since 2017, an assessment of relevance and additionality has taken place for each project, with the process harmonized across all sector and landscape programs. IDH should improve its ex-post monitoring at project level as currently this process is not formalized.

The Service Delivery Model (SDM) analysis is a structured way to identify the relevant needs and beneficiaries upfront at field level. IDH started carrying out SDM analyses in 2015 in order to model the economic viability of different deliveries. Findings are translated into forecasting of expected yield, cost of production, and income effects for farmers (and the implementing partner).

The needs of beneficiaries are monitored and evaluated over the course of the projects. This was confirmed by the in-depth project assessments.

Most ex-post reports conducted by external evaluators, confirm the relevance and additionality of IDH's interventions. An example is the Kenya Gender Based Violence (GBV) study, which concludes that the different aspects of the Gender Empowerment Program (GEP) endeavored to address the relevant root causes including household financial management and decision-making.

Interventions are generally aimed at sector governance or business practices, which means that IDH's direct beneficiaries are not always the ultimate beneficiaries. For example, companies can also be identified as beneficiaries, as well as farmers and/or workers. This is the case in projects including Race to the Top (RtT), Life and Building Safety (LABS), and the Ethiopian Horticulture Producer Exporters Association (EHPEA).

IDH's local presence contributes to safeguarding the needs of ultimate beneficiaries. IDH grew its local staff from approximately 60 contracted staff members outside the Netherlands in 2016 to 145 at the end of 2020, and these local staff members are valued for their commitment, expertise, and knowledge.

Stakeholders praise IDH's convening power, entrepreneurial mindset, and understanding of private sector dynamics, and confirm the relevance of IDH's impact themes. The convening power of IDH stands out, and make them a 'one of a kind' actor in this field. This is recognized as crucial in the successful design and implementation of projects, and IDH's additionality lies in the fact that it can accelerate projects. Without IDH, current results would not have been achieved at the same pace.

IDH could put more focus on the most relevant/effective programs/projects, and communicate better about choices to stop programs/projects. IDH is strong in kicking off new projects and programs, leveraging its convening power and innovative mindset. It is, however, less clear how IDH makes decisions on a portfolio level to stop or discontinue initiatives that don't deliver on set targets. We identified some initiatives for which there was no information available on why they ended, the lessons learned, or how this helped IDH to focus its efforts.

⁵ Criteria of the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCEd): https://www.enterprise-development.org/wp-content/uploads/DCEd_Demonstrating-Additionality_final.pdf

IDH's governance structure ensures an assessment on internal coherence. External coherence is confirmed by project documentation and some ex-post evaluations

IDH's pre-contracting process and governance structure support a uniform assessment on internal coherence. IDH's targets and strategy are described in the Multi-Year Plan and updated each year in the Annual Plans per commodity program or landscape. The PoCs are the foundation of the strategy. IDH innovation strategies and respective pilots show strong internal coherence; innovations build on each other.

Most in-depth project assessments demonstrate external coherence, though differ in their approach due to their nature. For example, in the Living Wage Benchmark project, Fyffes, IDH, other private entities, and the Rainforest Alliance collaboratively worked with participating farms to develop monitoring tools and pilot strategies and plans for improving worker compensation. This safeguarded coherence from the start of the project.

External reports express mixed views on the question of coherence. Three ex-post reports expressed positive conclusions on external coherence: the NICFI and ISLA landscapes and the Farm & Cooperative Investment Program (FCIP, cocoa). In these cases, coherence was sought with governmental efforts and other interventions.

Strong knowledge and convening power enable IDH to ensure external coherence; however, IDH should more clearly acknowledge the contribution of others. IDH brings the relevant stakeholders together to address the sustainability issues in a specific sector, and this helps to foster coherence and the additionality of interventions. IDH's ability to fund this work might also be a reason why stakeholders (especially companies) are willing to join. Some stakeholders note that IDH claims success for concepts to which it indeed contributed but did not act alone.



Most PoCs have achieved or are expected to achieve their objectives at output and outcome level for sector governance and business practices. For field level the objectives are less often met. These results should be attributed to IDH and its partners, not IDH alone

Over the course of 2016-20 donor funding contributed EUR 130,9 million and the private sector contributed EUR 229,9 million to the program and landscape portfolio of IDH, achieving respectively 95% and 83% of its targets. IDH monitored the progress of programs and sectors through a set of indicators mainly focused on output level.

IDH is actively changing its role to focus on establishing critical mass in various programs; however, concrete outcome level results are not always measurable:

The strategy for the “traditional” agricultural commodities cocoa, coffee, and tea as well as cotton and soy evolved over the course of the evaluation period.

Downstream and local convening led to innovative and better locally embedded projects. For example, IDH’s Landscape program is able to respond to key challenges around deforestation and peatland loss and is sufficiently flexible for context-specific adaptations.

- The sector platforms in the Fresh & Ingredients program grew their membership base beyond Dutch players but still have a strong core of very active Dutch companies.
- Convening the collective bargaining process in the tea sector in Malawi is also demonstrating IDH’s effectiveness in policy dialogue.
- Additional grants and co-investments help IDH to scale approaches; for example, the Farmfit Africa Program funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (USD 30 million).
- IDH has insufficient leverage to drive systemic change in complex global markets such as soy and timber that are not consolidated on the FMCG side. The Apparel and Aquaculture program do not seem to be designed to reach critical mass.

IDH did not act alone in any of its interventions; numerous partners have contributed to all outputs, associated outcomes and potential impact. Therefore, it does not make sense to attribute results directly to IDH (donor) funding in terms of, for example, “cost per farmer”, “hectares with better agricultural practices, or “hectares of forest protected”.

The Results Measurement Framework (RMF), the main tool for monitoring progress, failed to deliver robustness and transparency due to inconsistent reporting and lack of data-validation. We observed a mismatch between data collected (per program) and requested reporting unit (PoC at theme level). IDH has developed an improved data strategy and a new RMF to be implemented within the new strategic cycle 2021-25. It is not yet clear how this will

address all the challenges relating to verifiability and robustness of data. Despite the improvements, progress measurement will be challenging due to the innovative nature of the projects, the complexity, the scale, and the regions in which the interventions take place. New techniques and alternative sources (big-data, satellite imaging, AI) could help to better measure the impacts and do this in an efficient manner.

IDH increasingly focuses on measuring effectiveness of programs. Impact studies and end-lines were commissioned for most material PoCs, and measurement at field level often included an assessment on the adoption of practices. These evaluation reports are generally positive on effectiveness.

Field level impact does not in all cases relate to sector governance results. The reported impact at field level through the NICFI and ISLA landscape programs (NICFI, ISLA report) relates to pilot projects which aim to inspire a broader uptake, hence do not relate to sector governance changes. Across all programs IDH has worked with 84 companies on 95 Service Delivery Models (SDMs) in 22 countries in order to improve local production practices and benefit large amounts of smallholder farmers. Observed field level results through the program level assessments (see details in Appendix I) relate to individual SDM projects for which ex-post data was also collected through additional evaluations. In these cases, there is a link with business practices but not with sector governance. In the context of sector platforms, field level projects serve to generate learnings and inspiration, in order to be scaled within the sector by other companies or even cross sector.

Efficiency is not monitored in a structured way.

Cost efficiency is not monitored in a structured way and IDH's financial reporting system is not aligned with the PoC structure. It was not possible to determine which portion of IDH's activities is included in this assessment.

The organizational costs versus total expenditures ratio remained stable over the past four years and varied between 14-18%. Non-profits typically have overhead ratios of around 20% but some question the relevance of using a ratio like this as it will highly depend on what an organization aims to achieve and how it is organized.

The overall ratio between private sector and IDH contributions decreased and varies between programs despite IDH's ambition to increase the relative share of private sector contributions. The cotton and apparel program succeeded in attracting investments by the private sector and created a self-funding mechanism in which (private) funding safeguards future investments. However, the private sector showed less appetite to invest in as-yet unproven approaches in the context of challenging issues like deforestation and living wage. In addition, IDH shifted to work with smaller companies that have lower budgets available to invest. The expansion of the landscape approach sorts its effect; a larger share is not co-financed due to the fact that the finance model works differently and no longer meets the original co-financing definition.

IDHs procedures and requirements for implementing partners are perceived as cumbersome. Stakeholders argue that IDH has more complex administrative requirements than other funding organizations, and that IDH reporting requests are challenging and time consuming.



IDH steers systematically on sustainability but exit strategies do not always seem feasible within the given timeframe

Ex-post program evaluation reports show mixed results with regard to the long-term business case for farmers. Some of the third-party research reports (Wageningen University & Research report on Better Cotton Initiative, Agri Logic on Farm & Cooperative Investment Program) observe that farmers do not adopt trained practices fully or correctly. As a result, no or only limited impact can be measured. This does not necessarily mean that the ToC is not correct, but attention should be paid to understanding the driving force behind this. Sustained impact at field level can't be measured yet for most PoCs.

IDH's interventions are intended to last but ex-post evaluations conclude with mixed results, and for some interventions securing structural funding remains a challenge. It is difficult to sustain projects where IDH has an important convening role or a larger and more hands-on role like the facilitation of the platforms

IDH further enhances its relevance, additionality and effectiveness through five innovation strategies

Over the course of the evaluation period (2016-2020) IDH continued to innovate, aiming to create new ways to reach impact at scale. Five innovation strategies were identified to further drive sustainable market transformation:

1. Focus on data-driven insights to compile the business case for sustainable interventions (Farmfit, including Service Delivery Models).
2. Develop and deploy digital tools upstream and downstream to accelerate sustainable market transformation (Roadmap Living Wage, Digital Transformation).
3. Drive investable interventions from niche to norm through the development of innovative finance solutions.
4. Enable inclusive and transparent supply chains through the launch of a new market mechanism for landscape initiatives (SourceUp).
5. Unlock a premium market for smallholders, enabling them to earn a better income, through empowerment of SMEs (Value Chain Development).

With regards to coherence, relevance, additionality and effectiveness we observed the following:

- The five innovation strategies showed strong internal coherence and are coherent with IDH's impact themes.
- The innovations build on lessons learned in existing programs and on IDH's unique strengths and therefore safeguard relevance and additionality.
- Output data is available for Farmfit (private sector parties engaged, farmers reached, budget invested). For the other innovations like SourceUp, Finance Solutions, and Value Chain Development, a pipeline of projects has been developed but it is either too early in the engagement process or still confidential to report output data.
- Some pilots (Finance Solutions, Value Chain Development) show outcome level results, confirming effectiveness at project level.
- Each innovation has its own platform/website. The goals, target audiences, and end-user needs of these platforms are not always clear. The maintenance these platforms require might be underestimated. Future efficiencies might be gained by taking a more coherent approach in this context.
- Despite the confirmed internal coherence, relevance, and additionality of each innovation, IDH takes on many innovation tracks in parallel. It still remains to be seen whether IDH is able to deliver on effectiveness, impact, and sustainability for all of these tracks.

Figure V: Summary assessment of five innovation strategies

Innovation strategy	Innovation	Impact theme addressed	Relevance	Additionality	Effectiveness
Focus on data-driven insights to compile the business case for sustainable interventions	Farmfit		+	0/+	?
Develop and deploy digital tools upstream and downstream to accelerate sustainable market transformation	Roadmap on Living Wages		+	+	?
	Digital Transformation and advice		+	?	?
Drive investable interventions from niche to norm through the development of innovative finance solutions	Finance Solutions ; Farmfit Fund and technical assistance facilities		+	+	0/+
Enable inclusive and transparent supply chains through the launch of a new market mechanism for landscape initiatives	SourceUp		+	+	?
Unlock premium market for smallholders, enabling for them a better income, through empowerment of SMEs	Value Chain Development program		+	+	0/+

Most interventions are still running, so long term impact cannot be measured yet. Expectations may have been raised too high

For most PoCs it is too early to measure sustained impacts at field level. Realizing wider and sustained impacts usually takes a longer time-horizon than the current timespan of the projects. This challenge is also recognized in several third-party end evaluations of PoCs and emphasized by the theme experts.

An important point of concern is that IDH's ToCs lack specificity with regard to when to expect impact as well what exactly to expect. In many cases the ToC only describes a direction.

The next pages summarize the results per impact theme.

- We start for impact theme with a summary of key observations .
- Next we present a table which summarizes the results per PoC for the specific theme. A color scheme reflects our conclusion related to a specific result at the output-outcome or impact level for an individual PoC.
- For each theme, an independent expert was asked to reflect on our findings. We included their validation statement.
- Based on the RMF data and IDH's annual reports we indicated for each PoC the estimated number of people reached ("outreach") and budget spent ("budget"). Available data did not allow to specify per impact theme. The reported estimate (in the summary tables) represents the estimate for the full PoC.

3. IDH's contribution to results

Theme-level assessment



Smallholder Inclusion — key observations

Despite tangible impact and outcome at sector governance and business practices levels, the field-level results are less visible until now

- In the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI, cotton) and the Farm & Cooperative Investment Program (FCIP, cocoa), there is a clear connection between interventions in all three result areas (sector governance, business practices, and farm level sustainability). These two PoCs reached an impressive number of farmers through the program interventions and achieved measurable results at outcome level. These are also the programs with the largest budgets, demonstrating the effectiveness of interventions and confirming the ToC at this level.
- The Farmer Field Book analysis of the Cocoa Challenge Fund (part of the Farm & Cooperative Investment Program) concluded that across the board evidence for the impact of the Cocoa Challenge Fund program is mixed and not decisively positive.
- The “sector platforms” approach in the Fresh & Ingredients program provides the private sector with tools that enable them to meet their commitment. The projects at field level, co-funded by IDH, aim to provide examples, knowledge, and learnings for further scaling by the partners themselves. The scale of these projects, and therefore the number of farmers reached, is therefore relatively small. We did find evidence that new projects are in the pipeline to follow up on the pilot, but the actual scale is unclear.
- To a certain extent the coffee program and the tea program work similarly by addressing crop specific issues (e.g., climate smart coffee farming, inclusion of smallholders) and partnering with industry leaders to set up pilot projects (through Service Delivery Models). The intention is not to reach large numbers of farmers but to gain learnings and insights, and facilitate the partner in scaling. We found business practice impact level results as well as some plausible field level results in all three focus countries (Vietnam, Indonesia, Uganda) for the coffee program and for the tea project in Tanzania.
- For PoCs with a company commitment included in the intervention, like the Better Cotton Initiative and the sector commitments in Fresh & Ingredients, outcome level results regarding business practices are most clearly measured.
- Only for three PoCs observed field level results related to changes in sector governance: Farm & Cooperative Investment Program (FCIP, cocoa), the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI, cotton) and Trustea (tea). Positive impact level results for farmers are only plausible in the case of the Better Cotton Initiative; for Trustea, impact has not been measured.



Smallholder Inclusion — summary of results

Smallholder Inclusion				Sector governance			Business practices			Field level			
Program	PoC	Initiative	Budget	Outreach	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact
Cocoa	FCIP	FCIP	€€€		Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Orange	White	Green	Orange	White
	CNIP	CNIP	€		White	White	White	Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Green	White
Coffee	Vietnam	Vietnam	€€		Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Light Green	Light Green
	Uganda	Uganda	€€		Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Light Green	Green
	Indonesia	Indonesia	€€		Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Light Green	Purple
Cotton	BCI	BCI	€€€		Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
	Climate Resilience Program	Maharashtra	€		Green	White	White	Green	White	White	Green	Green	White
		Mozambique	€€		Green	White	White	Green	White	White	Green	Purple	White
F&I	Commodity Platforms and Sustainable Sourcing	SSI	€		Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	White	Green	Light Green	White
		SIFAV	€€€		Green	White	White	Green	White	White	Green	Green	Green
		SJC	€		Green	White	White	Green	Light Green	White	White	Green	White
		SNI	€		Green	White	White	Green	Light Green	White	Purple	Light Purple	Light Purple
		SVI	€		Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	White	Green	Green	Light Purple
	Value Chain Development	HortInvest *)	€		Green	White	Light Green	Green	Light Green	White	Green	Light Purple	Light Purple
		Cassava *)	€		Green	White	White	Green	Light Green	White	Green	Green	Green
Tea	India Trustea	India Trustea	€€		Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green	White
	Smallholder	Malawi Tea 2020	€		Green	White	White	Green	White	White	Green	Green	Light Green
		Tanzania - MOG/UTT	€		Green	White	White	Green	Light Green	Light Green	Green	Green	Light Green
		Rwanda - Wood Foundation	€		n/a	n/a	n/a	Green	White	White	Green	White	White

Legend: ■ Change & contribution observed ■ Some/Limited change and contribution observed ■ Change but no contribution observed ■ Some/Limited change but no contribution

■ Inconclusive No impact measured, various reasons, see detailed program assessments for context n/a: Not part of TOC

Budget: €: <1.000.000 €€: >1.000.000-<2.500.000 €€€: >2.500.000

Outreach: <50.000 >50.000-<250.000 >250.000

Smallholder Inclusion — expert validation

Dr. Alejandro Guarin — International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)

“My sense is that the evaluation does a good job with the material available. It seems to be that the shortcomings of the assessment are due to the shortcomings of the data available. Overall, I found a good effort to move from evidence to conclusions. In general, I think the report is well balanced, given the constraints of the framework.

The framework (Theory of Change) applied is quite clunky in my view (overly ambitious and complicated), so it is sometimes difficult to follow the logic. The ToC is not always clear and often too complex. ToCs on outcome or output level do not necessarily seem to lead to impact-level results. In my opinion, sector governance should ultimately be a means to achieving an end at the farm level, whether it is, for example, better livelihoods, quality product or sustainability. I challenge the relevance of claiming impact at the sector level. Aren't these outcomes, at best? These outcomes should be phrased as observed changes in behavior of the actors involved and made measurable. The current framework could imply that impact at the sector level weighs equal to impact at the field level, whereas it has to be proven that observed changes at the sector level indeed impact change at the field level. As IDH, it would concern me that many interventions, particularly at the farm level, show few results or are inconclusive with regard to impact and outcomes. IDH also should be cautious to push too much for impact and rather focus on learnings (outcome level) to improve future interventions.

In that light, I support the conclusion of, e.g. the FCIP program in this evaluation. It articulates the complexity of achieving the field-level impact. Even with the program objective (access to finance) achieved, it is not a given this results automatically in increased yields and farmers applying learnings from trainings correctly. There is much to be learned from, to strengthen future interventions and further investigate drivers for behavioral change of farmers.

With respect to the impact concluded for the Cotton program, I'm hesitant. Although I understand the formulation of 'plausibility that BCI improves the profitability of farmers through efficient use of inputs thereby decreasing input costs', there is no evidence provided that the cotton itself will be produced more sustainable. In broader sense, it seems that due to the way impact is defined in the ToC, there is a push for evidence to confirm ('Increased yield and/or quality of crop of interest, and/or profitability of crop of interest; and/or increased household income; and/or increased financial resilience or climate resilience'). The third-party evaluations commissioned would have more value if they are (also) transparent on what not has been achieved or

only weak results could be observed. In addition, I would expect third-party evaluations to make do a more deliberate attempt to engage with the literature on the topic.

A point of concern for me is the quality of the evidence. The evidence is very systematically scored across three dimensions, with a possible maximum score of 18. Across the sources, the average score is 6.5. I can't say what the threshold is for 'good' evidence, but it certainly suggests that it is far from ideal. Some evidence is more robust than others. In general, most evidence consist heavily of self-assessments and is are prone to a bias of the third-party evaluators and/or IDH. In general, the evidence tends to be overly positive for IDH. There is little focus on constructive criticism or reflection, or an assessment of the broader picture. I would like to invite IDH to focus their evaluations on generating learnings from the outcomes and on what it tells about IDH's effectiveness more generally.

I would have liked to see more disaggregation to understand better how and where the impact is occurring, also in relation to investments made. The evidence available does not allow to disaggregate the investments by intervention level (sector, businesses, farms). This would have provided additional insight as to the cost effectiveness of different types of investment. The same goes for a lack in disaggregated reporting enabling, e.g. a gender analysis to understand what the evidence says through a gender lens.

The most expensive programs (FCIP, SIFAV and BCI) appear to show very different achievements, so it doesn't seem like more money leads to more impact. As noted before, there are less green squares at the field level, and this seems to span all types of crops and sectors.

One last thought has to do with the way these interventions are designed. I know nothing about how these investments are decided, but some of the evidence is suggesting that training or business skills are not translating into material differences at the farm level. I wonder if this is suggesting a top-down approach in which interventions are being decided 'by committee' instead of being co-created with the communities, based on their concerns and priorities. I am speculating of course, but evidence in my mind speaks to some incompatibility by what IDH is offering and what people want/need.”

Mitigation of Deforestation — key observations

Strong outcome level results for sector governance in most landscapes; small scale field level sustainability impact observed in pilot projects.

- The key intervention in IDH's landscape approach is the Production, Protection and Inclusion partnership program. The ISLA and NICFI evaluations confirm the effectiveness of these and reported outcome level results across all landscapes. Outcome level and impact results for field level sustainability were related to pilot projects. These pilot projects aim to inspire a broader uptake hence do not relate to sector governance changes and have not achieved scale yet.
- The Cocoa and Forest Initiative (CFI) finalized the design phase in 2020, and outcome level results for business practices and sector governance have been measured. The progress to date has not yet resulted in field level impact.
- The market-end PoCs focus on convening the sector, raising awareness and creating market pull for sustainably sourced commodities. Therefore, with the exception of SourceUp, there are no field level outputs and outcomes. For SourceUp, it is too early to measure field level outputs and outcomes.
- One of the challenges in preventing deforestation through supply chain interventions is the risk of leakage, displacement, or spill-over effects at landscape level. Zero-deforestation may be achieved for particular supply chains and/or regions, but unsustainable production activities may have been transferred from a region with stringent regulations to another region with less strict rules. IDH pays little attention to acknowledging or mitigating this kind of leakage.



Mitigation of Deforestation — summary of results

Mitigation of Deforestation			Sector governance			Business practices			Field level			
Program	PoC	Budget	Outreach	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact
Cocoa	CFI	€€€										
Market Ends Programs	Market Ends Program Palm Oil	€€	n/a							n/a	n/a	n/a
	Market Ends Program Soy	€€€	n/a							n/a	n/a	n/a
	Market Ends Program Tropical Timber	€€€	n/a							n/a	n/a	n/a
	SourceUp	?								n/a	n/a	n/a
Landscapes (NICFI)	Brazil	€€€										
	Indonesia	€€€										
	Liberia	€€€										
Landscapes (ISLA)	Côte d'Ivoire	€€€										
	Ethiopia	€€€										
	Kenya	€€€										
	Vietnam	€€€										

Legend: Change & contribution observed Some/Limited change and contribution observed Change but no contribution observed Some/Limited change but no contribution
 Inconclusive No impact measured, various reasons, see detailed program assessments for context n/a: Not part of TOC

Budget: €: <1.000.000 €€: >1.000.000-<2.500.000 €€€: >2.500.000

Outreach: <50.000 >50.000-<250.000 >250.000

Mitigation of Deforestation — expert validation (I/II)

Dr. Eric Arets — Wageningen Environmental Research

“In summary, my conclusions are that the conclusions in the end-term evaluation are valid and correctly reflect the provided evidence. As also found in the midterm assessment, the used approach for assessing and scoring available evidence, including a scoring for different levels of quality of the documents in principle appears to be a good approach for evaluating the large amounts of documents and information sources that vary in scope and quality.

With regard to the quality of the evidence as indicated by the scoring in the draft evidence assessment framework, I have two observations:

- When assessing effects on deforestation, the assessment of developments over time (preferably including a baseline assessment) is considered to be an important element. Of the evidence documents listed, only 17% (25 out of 145) are based on research over time.
- The overall quality (based on the quality score) of the evidence used in the evaluation of the Cocoa and Market End programs appear to be relatively poor, with average scores of around 5 (out of a max score of 18). The evidence for the Landscape programs hence is much more conclusive than for the market programs which show a risk for bias and lack monitoring over time.

Effectiveness of realized outcomes

Effectiveness of realized outcomes in preventing deforestation is not always conclusive and sometimes only temporary. For example, the overview of outputs achieved on changed business practices in Indonesia (Table 16 in M.370) indicates for each of the landscapes an area (x ha) where sustainable production, farm rehabilitation or intensification interventions are being implemented. From this statement, it is not entirely clear if the objectives of PPI are actually met, as the objectives would be on all three elements, which implies and instead of or, including both improved production and protection of the landscape.

Interventions aimed at intensification of production only may not work in protecting the landscape from deforestation. There is mixed evidence that improved productivity close to forest areas actually releases pressure on those forests. A large number of studies indicate that without additional measures local yield increases lead to increased agricultural encroachment into forests. Moreover, productivity improvement may even encourage deforestation if commodities or products are involved that show an elastic demand, i.e. prices are not depressed when supply (locally) increases.

The Bumitama, West Kalimantan case study presented in M370, however, describes the successful implementation of interventions aimed at protecting the forest. At the outcome level, this seems to be successful. Additional spatial analysis, however, showed that at the field level, deforestation rate only showed a dip in deforestation in the year after Essential Ecosystem Areas (KEEs) were designated, but increased again in the years after that. The substantial decline in forest cover inside the KEE, after the KEE designation, is likely caused by forest fire. Success at the field level hence appears to be still uncertain and will need continuous attention and monitoring.

Reflections on plausibility of long-term impact at the field level in Brazil

The evaluation by KIT considers long-term impacts on the field-level sustainability in the Brazilian program to be plausible, mainly based on the inclusion of positive incentives for halting deforestation, and the anticipated key role of the CARs. When you only look at the number of CARs supported, then it does not yet indicate what the actual impact is. Recent studies on the impacts of the CAR on deforestation so far have shown mixed results. The conclusion that long-term impact is plausible in Brazil, therefore, in my opinion, seems a bit premature with the available evidence at this point.

The approach of providing positive incentives and to engage with non-complying parties providing technical assistance to enable their regularization and reinsertion in the market is important and differs very much from the currently often used exclusion when non-compliant. It would be interesting to see more evidence that this approach indeed is successful.

Mitigation of Deforestation — expert validation (II/II)

Mixed results on the field-level sustainability in ISLA Kenya

Key activities in the evaluated ISLA Kenya project focused on intensification of milk production and prevention of livestock grazing in forest areas. From the evidence provided, it is not clear, however, what was the relative scale of the interventions or how this relates to the (section of) the Mau forest landscape considered. The ISLA evaluation study (M.406) indicated that as a result of the livestock intensification project, milk production increased from 4.6 to 6.25 liters per cow per day. It is not clear if that would be overall, or only for the farmers participating in the program.

Based on what I have seen in the southern Mau forest landscape, it will only be the farmers with larger parcels of land who will be able to implement a non-grazing dairy production, with their cows in stables near the house (also needed for producing the biogas, which is not possible with free roaming livestock). If smaller farms follow the example of the bigger farms (triggered by the improved livelihood of these latter farmers), this may even increase pressure on available land and hence promote deforestation. To mitigate this, some kind of land reform will be necessary.

Challenges in preventing deforestation

One of the challenges in preventing deforestation through supply chain interventions is the risk of leakage or spill-over effects. Through supply chain interventions, zero deforestation may be achieved for particular supply chains and/or regions. This, however, is not always enough to also contribute to reduce the global-level deforestation because leakage or displacement may occur, transferring unsustainable production activities from a region with stringent regulations to another region with less strict rules, from one producer to another, or from one consumer market to another (e.g. Ingram et al. 2020). While I think this is an important aspect to take into consideration regarding deforestation, from the evaluated evidence, I find little attention of IDH for mitigating leakage.

Most interventions target companies that are well aware of and already implemented strategies around Mitigation of Deforestation. The effect of the interventions could be greater if companies that are not yet aware and who do not have policies in place to prevent deforestation would be targeted. The additionality of the interventions is not always clear. In addition, the scalability of the initiatives to a broader pool of companies that are more or less aware of their impact on deforestation is difficult to prove.

Anticipated new EU legislation

Regarding deforestation, the European Commission is preparing a new legislative framework on demand-side regulatory and non-regulatory measures in order to increase supply chain transparency and minimize the risk of deforestation and forest degradation associated with products placed on the EU market. IDH could play an important role in supporting the development and implementation of improved sector governance, business practices and field-level measures addressing the requirements of the new EU legislation. I assume IDH closely follows these developments in EU legislation. Depending on the measures proposed in this new EU legislation, adjustments to the current IDH methodologies could be needed.”

Gender Equality and Empowerment — key observations

Strong outcome and some impact results in Kenya (tea) and Ethiopia (flowers) but 'do no harm' across the full portfolio could not be assessed.

- The ToC on gender should approach the issue from two sides: do no harm and create positive impact. Currently 'do no harm' is not explicitly addressed. As a result, gender has not been sufficiently mainstreamed across IDH to effectively drive the agenda within the programs.
- Although an ex-ante assessment on "do no harm" is addressed in IDH's internal procedures, no data in this context could be provided.
- Gender should not be only about reaching women, but the selection of focus suggests that there is a tendency to focus interventions on sectors where women are a relatively large part of the work force.
- The gender project in Kenya (tea) and gender equality activities in the flower sector in Ethiopia (under the Floriculture Sustainability Initiative) both resulted in field level impact results. The pilot project in the Better Cotton Initiative was very well designed and documented from a gender perspective.
- The outcome level results vary in their nature – from addressing women specific labor conditions (Race to the Top, BOHESI Ghana) to more transformational as measured in the gender project in tea, Kenya.
- For the gender PoC in Kenya we can link observed field level impact to changes at sector governance level. Also, within the Malawi Tea 2020 PoC there is a link between sector governance and field level, at outcome rather than impact level. The same goes for BOHESI in Ghana through which working conditions for female workers are addressed (output level result). For the other PoCs addressing gender, either sector governance is not addressed (Cocoa Nutrition Initiative Program, Better Cotton Initiative, and Race to the Top) or the pilot project did inspire sector governance (Empowering the Source, Ethiopian Horticulture Producer Exporters Association).



Gender Equality and Empowerment — summary of results

Gender Equality and Empowerment				Sector governance			Business practices			Field level			
Program	PoC	Initiative	Budget	Outreach	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact
Apparel	Working Conditions: Working Engagement	Working Engagement (RttT)	€€		n/a	n/a	n/a						
	LABS	LABS	€		n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a			
Cocoa	FCIP	FCIP	€										
	CNIP	CNIP	€		n/a	n/a	n/a						
Cotton	BCI	BCI	€€€										
Fresh & Ingredients	Commodity Platforms and Sustainable Sourcing	FSI	€										
		SIFAV	€€€										
Tea	Malawi Tea 2020	Malawi Tea 2020	€€	?									
	Gender Kenya	Gender Kenya	€€										

Legend: Change & contribution observed Some/Limited change and contribution observed Change but no contribution observed Some/Limited change but no contribution
 Inconclusive No impact measured, various reasons, see detailed program assessments for context n/a: Not part of TOC

Budget: €: <1.000.000 €€: >1.000.000-<2.500.000 €€€: >2.500.000

Outreach: <50.000 >50.000-<250.000 >250.000

Gender Equality and Empowerment — expert validation

Dr. Anna Laven — Rokit Science, KIT Royal Tropical Institute

“Overall, the conclusions follow logically from the assessment of the evidence. The fact that IDH requested for an assessment on program level rather than organizational level is, however, a missed opportunity.

An assessment of IDH’s internal gender strategy, capacity and ambition is crucial to understand its maturity as convener of Gender Equality and Empowerment, and the progress made. I miss evidence on the integration of gender in IDH’s internal organization and on programs where gender was not identified as a theme. This makes it difficult to assess the risk of doing harm. This goes particularly for those programs/projects that are not gender intentional, and where ‘business as usual’ can imply that gender inequalities/disempowerment are reinforced. The evidence has not shown how and to what extent IDH has tried to safeguard the ‘do no harm’ principle, nor has there been any research done into the potential unintended consequences of IDH’s interventions. In addition, there is a gap in evidence on more holistic strategies, showing how gender is integrated in core sustainability themes, such as living income/living wage, child labor, deforestation, and in Landscape programs. The lack of this evidence suggests that a more integrated approach is still lacking.

The selection of focus PoCs in scope of this evaluation suggests that there is a bias to focus gender-related interventions on sectors where women are a relatively large part of the work force (such as apparel, cotton and tea), while ‘gender’ is not about reaching women. In sectors where men are dominant (such as cocoa), gender-related interventions tend to focus on women in alternative income generating activities and on women in traditional roles (instead of recognizing women as co-farmers and their specific challenges). This bias hinders transformative change. Moreover, several programs focus on outreach (e.g. training on GAP). However, being reached or trained does not automatically mean that women will also benefit (or will be empowered), as this will depend, among other, on their resources/skills, agency and decision-making power within the household and on dominant social norms. To be transformative, IDH should avoid a focus on gender only in sectors where women are dominant, and/or on women in traditional roles and put more emphasis on the underlying reasons for gender inequality and disempowerment, which is often rooted in social norms, and on involving men.

In the Tea program, IDH has shown its strength as convener of the Gender Empowerment Platform in Kenya and contributor to creating an enabling environment to address gender-based violence in the tea sector in Malawi. The work IDH has been doing to address GBV,

which is a highly complex issue, deserves appreciation and valuable lessons can be shared between countries and across sectors.

IDH is well-positioned to facilitate learning between sectors and countries. Efforts in this direction are appreciated and should be continued. E.g. the pilot project in cotton (BCI) was from a gender perspective very well designed and documented. In the pilot phase, already some positive results have been measured (e.g. significant change in the mindset of men/perceptions on tasks, decision making, etc.). The pathways for scaling up this pilot provide a roadmap for sector governance on gender equality in cotton. In addition, the results with regard to BOHESI suggest that not only positive results can be replicated in the sector (and further contribute to gender equality at the sector level), but also in other sectors, such as tea and flower. IDH is in an excellent position to convene further cross-sector learning.

I notice quite some differences in the quality of the evidence, and the level to which third-party organizations in charge of the specific program evaluations have been able to understand and assess the gender component. In most of the evidence provided, I missed a gender assessment and/or integration of gender in the ToC to understand the gender-related problems/ambitions and interpret results. There were some exceptions, such as BCI.

Finally, I would like to re-iterate my comment from the midterm evaluation: IDH has a set of characteristics that give it a high potential to drive gender transformative activities. The fact that they have the resources, knowledge, convening power, and independence from local governments, has enabled IDH to have great success in working with companies and being a catalyst ‘on the ground’. It needs to further capitalize on this, while integrating gender into its daily activities. I would have expected that every program would integrate gender, that all reporting is done in sex-aggregated way and that all programs have specific gender ambitions.”

Responsible Agrochemical Management — key observations

Strongest results observed in cotton (India) and projects in Vietnam (coffee, spices) but overall field level impact limited.

- The ToC on responsible agrochemical management seems to ignore the role of the agrochemical and could have addressed implementation of Integrated Pest Management and the use of advances in technology more explicitly.
- The intervention strategy related to responsible agrochemical management differs across the respective programs due to differences between crops and the nature of the programs. Overall, field level impact is not very substantive.
- Cotton is the only program with a focus on responsible use of agrochemicals. It is addressed in the Better Cotton Initiative standard, meaning that field level results could be measured. This is the only PoC where there is a clear link between sector governance results and observed impact level results at field level.
- The interventions and reported outcome level results in tea, coffee and spices in Vietnam all relate to the work of ISLA Vietnam. Outcome level results observed for sector governance are due to the work in the agrochemical working group. Strong local presence contributed largely to measured results.
- The observed results in coffee in Vietnam relate to the company-driven Service Delivery Models although they emerged (partly) under the ISLA program, so to a certain extent sector governance influence could be observed. The observed changes at outcome level in the Tea PoC (Trustea) could not methodologically be attributed to the respective intervention, however these interventions can be traced back to sector level. The results in the Floriculture Sustainability Initiative (FSI) and Sustainable Spices Initiative (SSI) relate to project level interventions which have a sector governance component. The progress booked through the Cocoa and Forest Initiative (CFI) has not yet resulted in field level impact



Responsible Agrochemical Management — summary of results

Responsible Agrochemical Management					Sector governance			Business practices			Field level		
Program	PoC	Initiative	Budget	Outreach	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact
Coffee	Vietnam	Vietnam	€€		Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Green	White	Green	Green	Light Green
Cotton	BCI	BCI	€€€		Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green
Fresh & Ingredients	Commodity Platforms and Sustainable Sourcing	FSI	€€		Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Green	White	Green	Green	Green
		SSI	€		Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Green	White	Green	Green	Green
		SIFAV	€€€		Green	White	White	White	White	White	White	White	White
Aqua-culture	Aquaculture	Aquascapes	€€		Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green
		Local Food	€€		Light Green	Light Green	Yellow	Light Green	Light Green	Yellow	Light Green	Light Green	Yellow
		Innovation	€€		n/a	n/a	n/a	Light Green	Light Green	Yellow	Light Green	Light Green	Yellow
Tea	India Trustea	India Trustea	€€		Green	White	White	Green	Green	White	Green	Light Purple	White
	Smallholder	Vietnam	€		Green	Green	White	Green	White	White	Green	Purple	White

Legend: ■ Change & contribution observed ■ Some/Limited change and contribution observed ■ Change but no contribution observed ■ Some/Limited change but no contribution

■ Inconclusive No impact measured, various reasons, see detailed program assessments for context n/a: Not part of TOC

Budget: €: <1.000.000 €€: >1.000.000-<2.500.000 €€€: >2.500.000

Outreach: <50.000 >50.000-<250.000 >250.000

Responsible Agrochemical Management — expert validation

Emeritus Prof. Graham Matthews — Imperial College London

"I support the conclusions of this research and I would like to highlight the following:

I stated in the midterm report that the government needed to direct more attention to the pesticide registration process and that rotation of the use of pesticides needed to be rotated across regions to establish a pesticide resistance management strategy. For the end-line evaluation, it is still valid that the government needs to be more diligent regarding registration of products. It seems that the importance of the role of the government in this context is underestimated in IDH's interventions. The use of pesticides should also be better controlled to restrict overuse and allow rotation of modes of action to minimize pests developing resistance. More emphasis is needed on the common name of pesticides rather than local trade names. There is need to include biopesticides, but their application is more complex compared with chemicals.

Major changes in the way pesticides are applied in relation to formulation, spray volume, droplet spectrum need to be implemented to reduce adverse environmental impacts. From historical perspective, this area did not innovate much over the past decades. With their innovative mindset, IDH could have addressed this in their strategy. Currently, spray technology is evolving and innovations, such as drones, are promising to change the application of insecticides on cotton, as in China. The adoption of these new innovations relies heavily on the support of government to provide information for their adoption. Using drones will reduce exposure of farmers to pesticides and eliminate using heavy knapsack sprayers. Recommendations about how to apply pesticides need to be the result of well-managed research trials by government and universities to provide more detailed advice on pest management. Other problems are the result of the failure by governments to regulate the use of pesticides and to ensure proper practical training is required by law for users and those marketing pesticides.

Looking at business practices, support for providing booklets, posters and apps as well as support for radio/television programs to alert farmers on best practice during the crop growing season can play an important part of the implementation of safer and more effective integrated pest management. This could have been addressed more explicitly. Digitization is developing fast, resulting in an abundance of apps available for farmers. Before further investing in apps, I would recommend IDH to thoroughly research the actual user needs, given the results of the evaluation in Vietnam in the SSI program. There seems to be a distinct contrast between 89% of the farmers trained that get certified, yet relatively few know

about the app. It is difficult to assess how important and useful the app is in farmers' daily practices, yet many advocate the use of an app in our digital era as a source of information and guidance.

Over the years, BCI have undoubtedly implemented more training, but the methodology of using pesticides needs to be improved. Much has been achieved with field facilitators, but as indicated above, much more needs to be accomplished with more definitive recommendations developed by researchers. Government must succeed with updating pesticide registration to stop the use of highly hazardous insecticides. Clearly the impact of the COVID-19 virus has limited obtaining all the information needed to show how much has been achieved so far. My concern here is that in using percentage changes contrasting BCI supported farmers versus other farmers, there is no indication of the precise number of farmers being compared or the proportion of BCI farmers who received practical training and whether any tests to assess the farmers' knowledge have taken place. There should be more emphasis on monitoring the quality of training and measuring actual adoption. No mention is made of the need by government to withdraw registration of highly hazardous pesticides or the need to also train those selling the pesticides, although BCI recognize the need for the central government to take action.

In addition, there are weaknesses as farmers still rely to a considerable extent on help from those selling the pesticides. The agrochemical industry is a major influencer, but their interest has been primarily in selling the insecticides and have a large influence on which are used. However, they have generally not received practical training or been directly involved in the sale of application equipment or personal protective equipment (PPE)."

Living Wage and Working Conditions — key observations

Strong results with impact at field level in Malawi (tea), and Vietnam and India (apparel)

- IDH played a key role in the observed impact level results achieved through the Malawi 2020 program; the decrease of the living wage gap and enhancement of collective bargaining were critical targets and complex issues to tackle.
- Improved working conditions in the apparel and sportswear sectors in India and Vietnam, and the banana sector in Ecuador, are additional impacts at field level that were achieved with IDH's contribution.
- With the Dutch retail commitment on living wages, and new and more ambitious strategies for the Floriculture Sustainability Initiative (FSI) and Sustainability Initiative Fruit and Vegetables (SIFAV) in place, it is likely that sustainability became further embedded in these sectors. Child labor is being addressed at sector level through the Sustainable Spices Initiative (SSI) and Sustainable Vanilla Initiative (SVI). A multi-stakeholder membership is no guarantee of success and therefore IDH should be careful to anticipate the increased leverage this membership/increased dialogue can provide on outcome and impact level.
- For both PoCs in the apparel programs the observed improvements at field impact level relate to changes at sector governance level.
- The observed impact within the Sustainability Initiative Fruits and Vegetables (SIFAV) at field level does relate to change in sector governance but not as a result of SIFAV; rather, it is a result of the BOHESI project in Ecuador, co-funded by IDH.



Living Wage and Working Conditions — summary of results

Living Wage and Working Conditions					Sector governance			Business practices			Field level			
Program	PoC	Initiative	Budget	Outreach	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact	Output	Out-come	Impact	
Apparel	Working Conditions: Working Engagement	RttT	€		Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed			Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	
	LABS	LABS	€		Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed		Change & contribution observed		Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	
Fresh & Ingredients	Commodity Platforms and Sustainable Sourcing	FSI	€		Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed		Change & contribution observed			Change & contribution observed			
		SSI	€		Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed		Change & contribution observed			Change & contribution observed			
		SIFAV	€€€		Some/Limited change and contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed		Change & contribution observed			Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed
		SJC	€		Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed		Change & contribution observed			Change & contribution observed			
		SVI	€		Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed		Change & contribution observed			Change & contribution observed	Some/Limited change but no contribution		
Tea	Malawi Tea 2020	Malawi Tea 2020	€€		Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed			Change & contribution observed	Change & contribution observed	Some/Limited change but no contribution	

Legend: ■ Change & contribution observed ■ Some/Limited change and contribution observed ■ Change but no contribution observed ■ Some/Limited change but no contribution

■ Inconclusive No impact measured, various reasons, see detailed program assessments for context n/a: Not part of TOC

Budget: €: <1.000.000 €€: >1.000.000-<2.500.000 €€€: >2.500.000

Outreach: <<50.000 >50.000-<250.000 >250.000

Living Wage and Working Conditions — expert validation (I/II)

Dr. Matthew Alford — Manchester Business School, University of Manchester

“The report provides a transparent, well balanced and detailed assessment of both the achievements, successes and challenges that cut across this ambitious set of programs. The suite of IDH programs under review have achieved a great deal, and represent a significant step forward in closing the living wage gap and improving working conditions. I therefore support the conclusions based on the assessment of evidence provided.

In apparel, IDH has played a central role in driving change. Particularly impressive has been the level of engagement with public/state actors, which is critical for achieving sustainable gains. More work could be done in terms of actually making long-term results more concrete and tangible. However, IDH has laid important foundations for future work resulting in a pathway to impact. At the business practice level, the LABS initiative has clearly become more embedded in brands’ business practices and supplier relations, which is absent in the RttT program. At the field level, RttT and LABS have led to contributions and positive changes. While this is clearly variable across programs and dimensions of working conditions, an important foundation has been laid on which to build.

For the Malawi Tea 2020 program, much has been achieved at the sector governance level to decrease the living wage gap and enhancing collective bargaining. These are two highly ambitious and yet critical targets to ensure sustainable improvements. IDH played a key role in this, despite parallel initiatives and measures that could have also contributed to the progress made. At the business practices level, positive change is clear at the output/outcome level. It is too early to measure long-term impact, with only sporadic success stories evident among certain buyers, and no guarantees that sustainable sourcing will be embedded in the longer term. Regarding the field level, evidence provided for ‘impact’ is more compelling, despite there being much more to do going forward. Reducing the living wage gap is a big achievement, and it is commendable that the report notes the need for union empowerment/activity to secure sustainable gains; it is also essential that the government (which could arguably play more of a role) be engaged with in future. Going forward, I would like to emphasize that an integrated ground-level assessment of living wages and working conditions is crucial, taking into account both measurable standards (e.g. wage levels, health and safety standards, working hours) and enabling rights (trade union representation, freedom of association, non-discrimination, etc.).

Although the programs under Fresh & Ingredients are impressive and ambitious, I’m less convinced by the gains. Commitments are made, but tangible outcomes emanating from multi-stakeholder initiatives that would lead to impact were missing. A multi-stakeholder membership is no guarantee of success, and therefore IDH should be careful to anticipate the increased leverage this membership/increased dialog can provide on the outcome and impact level. I was also unconvinced by claims around the broader sector-level impact. While the roadmap for living wages is a commendable agenda, concrete data on the level of private sector uptake would have been useful. Substantial and impactful gains have been made through BOHESI – though notably more focused on health and safety – and less on living wages and/or collective bargaining. F&I achievements for business practices and at the field level were mixed. While SIFAV and SVI demonstrate some advances on working conditions (including child labor, health and safety and traceability), there is little, by way of tangible benefits, reported aside from the BOHESI project. This is partly because of different lifecycles of the projects.

Living Wage and Working Conditions — expert validation (II/II)

Going forward

Recent academic evidence (Alford, Visser and Barrientos 2021) indicates that MSIs can in fact contain power asymmetries and imbalances between private, public and civil society actors, which can restrict social gains. The formulation of an MSI alone is no guarantee of sustainable sourcing. In fact, certain literature indicates that MSIs can in fact provide brands with an opportunity for 'greenwashing' (Alford et al. 2021; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014), without altering or improving their supply chain practices. This is a point that applies across all three program areas (apparel, tea, F&I), wherein the continued collaboration, dialog and engagement between actors (private, public, civil society) is essential to secure sustainable improvements in living wages and working conditions.

Certain sectoral change elements and contributions remain non-compulsory and have not been converted into legislation/regulations. It will be critical to engage public/state actors throughout the project lifecycle, to secure buy-in and increase likelihood of incorporating standards/guidelines into legislation. (see Alford and Phillips 2018; Bartley 2018; Locke 2013)

IDH programs have (understandably) focused on particular country contexts. Yet, given the 'global' nature of these industries, for sustainable social gains to be realised – such as living wages and working conditions – a truly 'global' and sector-wide approach is needed. This is to avoid a potential 'race to the bottom' on standards, in the event a particular country (e.g. Malawi) increases quality and prices of products, prompting brands to look elsewhere. This will require alliances, negotiations and bargaining on a sector-wide basis, beyond particular supply chains sourcing from one or two country contexts.

I believe business practices being the most challenging area for which to achieve impact. Branded companies are themselves under substantial pressure from shareholders to secure high-quality goods at low cost, which inevitably affects their sourcing strategies (Anner 2020). The challenge is ensuring commitments are sustained on a sector-wide basis, and beyond a handful of companies (e.g. only Dutch retailers, FSI). Another point recognized as crucial in recent literature (Barrientos et al. 2016), is the fact that the geography of end markets is changing.

The field-level impact achieved across the three programs is already impressive, ranging from enhanced worker voice and social auditing (apparel); improved worker safety and productivity (F&I/BOHESI); and narrowing the living wage gap (Malawi Tea). To enhance impact further across these projects, I would suggest greater emphasis be placed on engaging with and empowering local civil society stakeholders – NGOs and particularly trade unions."

4. Conclusions and recommendations



Conclusions & recommendations (I/II)

One of the key assumptions of IDH's strategy is that creating change in sector governance, business practices, and field level sustainability will result in market transformation and systemic impact for the public good. The vehicles to drive these changes are Proofs of Concept (PoCs). Scale should be achieved by either replication of the successful PoC and/or scaling the intervention.

Our findings are mixed:

- We observe that IDH has grown into a big and influential actor in its context.
- The available data support the hypothesis that IDH is an impact-driven organization that systematically steers on relevance, coherence and sustainability while scoring well on effectiveness, with most tangible results in sector governance and business practices. We also observed that IDH enhances its relevance, additionality and effectiveness through innovation.
- We conclude that IDH is capable of accelerating existing initiatives (Cocoa & Forests Initiative, Better Cotton Initiative, Trustea), putting the pieces of a unique (innovative) puzzle together (Value Chain Development), or providing innovative finance solutions, including taking first loss positions (project with Neumann Kaffee Gruppe in close collaboration with ABN AMRO, Rabobank, BNP Paribas, USAID).
- We conclude that IDH's ToCs per impact theme are logical but not always transformative by design.
- We conclude that, to be transformational, you indeed need interventions at all three levels (sector governance, business practices, and field level sustainability) but also that you need a global reach of interventions at both supply and demand side. The best PoC addressing this is the scaling of the Better Cotton Initiative.
- Straightforward replication of PoCs to reach scale and market transformation seems to be an overly simplistic assumption of reality. We have seen PoCs addressing all result areas in the local context of a specific theme. For example, in Malawi a decrease in the Living Wage gap could be observed. Theoretically this PoC is ready for replication. However, given the global nature of the sector, a truly global and sector-wide approach is needed to come to transformation. Next to that we observed that successful field level interventions potentially lead to replication, for example with new projects leveraging learnings of the Gender project in flowers in Ethiopia, but this replication is not necessarily a guarantee for scale within a sector. The best example of replicability and continuous improvement is the Service Delivery Model methodology (SDM). However, SDM is a methodology and not an intervention program in itself. It is a tool for companies to be (hopefully) more effective.

- Our assessment showed that IDH overpromised on its impact. IDH's ToCs lack specificity on when to expect impact as well what exactly to expect. This makes it challenging to determine the reason why impact cannot be measured yet: it could be due to insufficient attention given to the complexity of the issue, execution error, or other driving forces.
- We observe that IDH has an organic way of learning and an entrepreneurial drive, resulting in many new initiatives. As a result, IDH efforts are diluted. At the same time there is a strong focus on quantifying a large number of KPIs and a push for proofing impact whereas a focus on understanding crucial outcomes might be more effective.

Conclusions & recommendations (II/II)

Going forward we recommend:







- a) **IDH should make a strategic choice on its role and portfolio.** Is IDH an incubator or does it want to drive transformative change in a few sectors? As an incubator IDH can leverage its innovative power and entrepreneurial drive, addressing many issues at a smaller scale to test and improve a specific approach. IDH will need others to further scale. On the other hand, for transformative change at global scale IDH's focus should be on one or two issues and a small selection of sectors; even then, being prepared to accept failure. The choice is not necessarily black and white. The portfolio can be built along these lines, based on sector analysis and acknowledging there are more potential pathways from niche to mainstream than the model applied for the 2016-20 strategy.⁶
- b) Whichever choice is made, **IDH should be transparent on the expected impact within a specific timeframe in close collaboration with donors and other stakeholders.** IDH should commit to and describe clear outcomes, and where possible the impacts as well as external factors that will determine these. Next to IDH's contribution, it should be transparent about the contributions of other parties as well as the role of donors.
- c) **Ensure that the supporting systems, procedures and processes are in place** to safeguard relevance, additionality, coherence, and sustainability across the full portfolio as well as over the timeline of the respective interventions and in line with the choices made (incubator vs transformer):
- Align budget reporting with the intervention agenda enabling future assessments on cost-effectiveness and intermediate monitoring.
 - Extend the Investment Committee Process with an interim check and an end evaluation for most material interventions on key aspects (e.g., requested KPIs on ROI, way of addressing 'do no harm'). Ensure findings of the Investment Committee Process are accessible for future evaluators. Address current missing OECD/DAC criteria in the process (coherence).
 - Encourage the search for structural learning and reward transparency in communication. Systematically administer which lessons were learned at program level and ensure exchange of learnings between programs in a structural way.
- Be more targeted in data requests towards the implementing partners, limit number of KPIs, and ensure the partner benefits equally from efforts. Be transparent on how data is used.
 - Monitor whether exit strategies (intervention level) are still valid and feasible over the course of an intervention and adjust where necessary. Be involved in and develop ways to scale programs and initiatives and adjust exit timing to the need of the program. Do not leave a project too soon. Determine whether a project is indeed scalable, and whether others are willing to invest.
- d. **Strengthen the future evidence base and align upfront with donors which PoCs and/or interventions should be central in the evidence base,** to prevent this being determined in the context of the evaluation.
- Ensure the most material interventions are covered through independent evaluations (baseline and end-line) and safeguard consistency in approach of these evaluations, for example with consistent interpretation of OECD/DAC criteria. Ensure it includes both impact measurement at field level and the adoption of practices as a proxy for impact including an analysis on why farmers have or have not adopted the improved practices.
 - Guide and monitor programs and interventions with respect to the program level ToC; avoid loaded terms, limit KPIs, and ensure clear description of expected results and outcomes. Ensure outcomes are defined as change in behavior of the beneficiaries. Specify achievable and measurable ambitions at program and intervention level, be explicit on expected timelines, and bring these in line with the timeline of the intervention.
 - Review the new Results Measurement Framework and include more clear direction on how data should be verified, as well as suggestions for how this can be organized. The document should also address how to monitor consistency across programs and/or projects within a program.
 - Consider including new techniques and alternative sources (big-data, satellite imaging, AI) to support impact measurement in an efficient manner.

⁶ Market transformation model: 4 phases of market transformation by [NewForesight](#)

Appendix

- I. Description projects included for the in-depth assessment
- II. Overview ex-post evaluation reports
- III. Limitations and disclaimer

Appendix I - Description projects included for an in-depth assessment

Theme	Program	PoC/project	Description
	Fresh & Ingredients (SIFAV)	Next Steps in Sustainability- Measuring Impact and Testing Living Wage ("Fyffes")	IDH worked with Fyffes, Rainforest Alliance and other partners to advance the payment of living wages in the banana sectors in Costa Rica and Belize. Specifically, they sought to research benchmarks, understand the living wage gaps and work with participating farms to develop monitoring tools and pilot strategies and plans for improving worker compensation. IDH co-funded this program, which has now concluded.
	Market Ends	Palm oil	To achieve the goal of 100% sustainable palm oil in Europe by 2020 (palm oil that is traceable to plantation level, with mill level as an intermediate step), IDH is focusing on the largest European offtake markets that have not yet made this commitment, such as Spain and Poland. The initiative focuses on the private sector in Europe (Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK), but ultimate beneficiaries are palm oil producers in South-east Asia (e.g. Malaysia and Indonesia). On one side, IDH works with national platforms, whereas on the other design and execute the landscapes work (SourceUp) to ensure alignment between the sector and field levels.
	Cocoa	Cocoa & Forest Initiative	In the Cocoa & Forests Initiative (CFI), IDH works with the World Cocoa Foundation and its members, The Prince of Wales's International Sustainability Unit and the local governments to end deforestation and promote forest restoration linked to cocoa growing.
	Fresh & Ingredients (FSI)	Empower the Source (EHPEA)	When looking for a way to work on gender equality, IDH and the Floriculture Sustainability Initiative (FSI) came across BSR and their cooperation with the Ethiopian Horticulture Producer Exporters Association (EHPEA). Together, they set up this initiative with a focus on female workers in the flower sectors in Ethiopia. Their aim was to increase access to general and reproductive healthcare, increase participation in decision making and strengthen worker agency. In parallel, the initiative was used as a tool to further improve social standards used by the FSI members.
	Cotton	Securing Smallholder Livelihoods in Rainfed Maharashtra	IDH partnered with Watershed Organisation Trust (WOTR) to improve water access in Maharashtra, India. The initiative had three areas: access to water, improving water management and increasing smallholder climate resilience. IDH co-funded this initiative, which has now concluded.
	Coffee	Coffee Vietnam (SDM)	IDH worked with numerous partners (e.g. NKG, Ecom, Nedcoffee, Simexco, Nespresso, Olam, Volcafe) to support coffee farmers on sustainable water and agrochemical use. Specifically, IDH supported Service Delivery Model (SDM) analyses to model the economic viability of different delivery systems to optimize input use and increase adoption of irrigation systems with farmers. The focus areas were: reduced water used, affordable and efficient irrigation solutions, improved policies on water reduction, and responsible agro-input use through building service delivery of reliable inputs in combination with soil testing.

Appendix II – Overview ex-post evaluation reports

The table below summarizes our assessment of the ex-post evaluation reports. All reports assessed, covered effectiveness (the extent to which output- and outcome-level results have been achieved). We included these findings in our program-level assessments and in more detail in the program reports. The summary of these findings is included in the paragraph on Effectiveness. That also goes for the criterion 'Impact'.

Figure 10: Summary of findings through ex-post evaluation reports

Report	Themes	Relevance	Additionality	Coherence		Efficiency	Sustainability
				External	Internal		
1 – LABS Apparel MYP 2-16-2020 – Independent Impact Research: Final Evaluation Report (Mekong Economics)		?	+	+	?		?
2 – RttT Apparel MYP 2-16-2020 – Independent Impact Research: Final Evaluation Report (Mekong Economics)		?	?	+	?		?
3 – Tea Kenya 'Addressing Sexual Harassment and Gender Based Violence in Kenya Tea Industry': An Impact Assessment of IDH Gender Empowerment Program – Kenya (ACEPIS)		++	++				+
4 – NICFI Evaluation of the Connecting Production, Protection & Inclusion Partnership Programme (KIT Royal Tropical Institute)		+	++	+	?	?	+
5 – ISLA Evaluation of Initiative for Sustainable Landscapes Program (ISLA) (Unique)		+		++		?	++
6 – FCIP FCIP 2017-2021 end evaluation: Draft evaluation report (technopolis group)		++	+	++		?	++
7 – CNIP Summative Evaluation of Cocoa Nutrition Innovation Program (CNIP) in Ghana: Revised Draft Report v3 (PDA)		?				?	+
8 – Aquaculture Aquaculture Impact Study: Key findings from an evaluation (Akvo)		+	+	?	+	-	+

Legend:

- ++ Meets the OECD DAC criterion
- + Partially meets the OECD DAC criterion
- Does not meet the OECD DAC criterion
- ? Inconclusive
- Not evaluated in the respective report

Appendix III

Limitations and disclaimer

This report is intended solely for the information and use of IDH — the Sustainable Trade Initiative — and is not intended to be used by anyone other than anyone other than this specified party. Any other party that obtains a copy and chooses to rely on it in any capacity does so at its own risk. It is not the responsibility of KPMG to provide information to any third party that has become known or available at any time after the date of this report. KPMG accepts no responsibility or liability for the use of this report other than the purpose for which it has been prepared and accept no responsibility or liability to parties other than IDH.

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Data presented and use of the report

The procedures that have been performed to establish this report did not constitute an audit or other assurance engagement. We often used data provided by IDH and other parties to come to conclusions (i.e. annual reports, harvest reports, impact reports). Consequently, our report does not express any assurance as to the reliability of such financial or other data, provided by IDH and other parties, in the report.





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